The 12-point Agreement and the Future of Democracy in Nepal

Whatever be the future results, which are not dependent on the Nepalese revolutionaries but on the amalgam of international and national factors, they have created a crisis of legitimation for the monarchy, alienated its middle class support-base gathered during its alliance with parliamentary forces, and brought the exploited and oppressed labouring classes to the centre-stage. It is clear that any future political arrangement will have to deal with the alternative participatory institutions and popular aspirations that they have helped in generating during the decade of people’s war.


The 12-point Agreement and the Future of Democracy in Nepal

Pratyush Chandra

ML INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER (JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 2006)

Four Phases of the Democratic Movement in Nepal

The present-day Nepalese democratic movement has perhaps entered its fourth phase now. The first ended with its partial victory in 1990, with the accommodation of the “democrats” in the power structure, which eventually frustrated the movement’s vigour, alienating its committed vanguards and grassroots. It was also at that moment that the Nepalese “long march” started to re-base the people’s movement among the people - peasantry, working class and other downtrodden sections - and look for the occasion to rise again as a contra-power rather than being glued to the old power structure, becoming its agency for manipulating ‘demos’ to preserve the ‘cracy’. This second phase saw mobilisation and dispersal of the movement beyond a few urban centres. The cry for democracy - for “self-determination” - reached hitherto untouched zones of the society. It is not strange that Mao’s model of strategy-formulation - of re-building the democratic movement from below in peasant societies like those in Nepal formed the guidelines for the revolutionaries there. This phase ended with the announcement of the ‘people’s war’ beaconing a new phase, of the rise of dual power.

The history of the third phase is well accounted in two recent collections - of the reports by Li Onesto (1), and of Baburam Bhattarai’s writings (2). They provide graphic descriptions of the fast-changing Nepalese polity embedded in the ever-dynamic post-cold war international political economy. Bhattarai’s works, especially, reflect the Maoist revolutionaries’ ability to dialectically cope up with the unfolding of the multivariate reality that always reveals itself in a piecemeal manner, never in totality. A historicist may find the Maoist strategies and tactics as frequently shifting. This is true for most of the political analysts - journalistic or serious. They are, however, ignorant of the pains of a revolutionary movement that bases itself on a continuous critique of international capitalism, its subordinate political economic structures and their diverse manifestations in deeds rather than simply in words. The movement itself is the epitome of this multi-level critique.

The Maoist’s ability to establish and flourish as the counter-power against the local state formation nurtured by global imperialism has perhaps heralded the fourth phase in the new democratic transformation in Nepal. The consistency and strength of the Nepalese revolutionaries, have rendered a fatal blow to the corporatist-monarchist-landlordist alliance with petty-bourgeois parliamentarism. In a way, this alliance was sponsored and nourished by imperialists to gain a decisive control over the region. India’s decision not to renew the 1978 treaties on trade and transit rights in 1989, leading to a major strangulation of the Nepalese economy, enforced this ‘nationalist’ compromise in 1990. It allowed the imperialists to check the arbitrariness of absolutism and radicalisation of the democratic movement, and gear up the local political economic arrangements in their own favour. However, the energy that was released in this process could not be fully confined in this official arrangement. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, it allowed the radicals a freehand to reorient the democracy movement towards the oppressed masses independent of wavering petty bourgeois democrats, afraid of any drastic structural transformation. A decade long success of this grassroots movement today seems to have reoriented the aspirations of the Nepalese petty-bourgeoisie too forcing the “democratic” parties to form an alliance with the revolutionaries against “the autocratic monarchy”. The 12-point agreement between the Maoists and seven parliamentary parties, along with the unilateral ceasefire by the revolutionaries, perhaps, marks the beginning of the new, fourth phase in the Nepalese democratic struggle, in the Nepalese struggle for self-determination.

The 12-Point Agreement and The Success of People’s War

The text of the agreement shows the willingness of the democrats - both parliamentarian and revolutionary - to rethink their respective strategy to save the coordination achieved so far. Although it is hard to prognosticate all the implications of this agreement, the contradictory aspirations are clearly reflected in the text. The unwillingness of the moderates to go beyond constitutional monarchy is reflected in the criticism of “autocratic monarchy”, instead of monarchy itself. On the other hand, the agreement talks about absolute democracy, too. Only time will determine where this Cartesian unification of spirits of ‘democracy’ will lead. However, the major breakthroughs are the refiguring of the issue of “constituent assembly” on the agenda for the ‘unified’ people’s movement, with that of sweeping away the ‘royalty’ of the Nepalese armed forces (however, the latter is not clearly spelt out) (3). Independent statements from the revolutionary leaders indicate that they are willing to rethink their stand on “constitutional monarchy”, if a constituent assembly is formed.

The post-agreement political scenario may perhaps seem quite unclear, but it will be wrong to make a mechanical interpretation of it. Some “radical” outsiders want to think that the Maoists are using the agreement simply as a tactic, as such compromises go against the spirit of revolution. However, one must realise the truth of Mao’s pronouncement that the complete victory of revolution will take hundreds of years, and a revolutionary force needs to be prepared for all eventualities in “the process of continuous revolution and counter-revolution”, and it cannot rely on formulas. The Nepalese revolutionaries’ understanding on “relationship between the Party, Army, State and the People” is significantly based on the basic idea of “the rights of self-determination of the masses” (4). Throughout the history of people’s war, they have built on coordinating with various ‘autonomous’ movements even if they have not frequently been conscious of it. There have been occasions where they have faltered, but have readily rechecked themselves. Hence, identifying only the militarist aspect of people’s war in Nepal is reducing its history, experience and logic to nought, to mere formulas derived from “teachings” and “preaching”, themselves generalisations of past experiences. It amounts to making people’s war and sacrifices goals in themselves, against their function to unleash the people’s “creativity and energy, making them the new rulers with more responsibilities” (5).

The documents of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) along with Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai’s remarks on the situation in both their statements and interviews reveal their distinct “pessimism of intellect, optimism of will” regarding the Nepalese situation. Bhattarai in his recent interview clearly stated the constraints in which the Maoists are operating:

“We are not attempting a final military victory right now, but are working for a negotiated political settlement either directly for a democratic republic or for the election to a constituent assembly. That is basically for two reasons. First, given the vacillation of a large section of the urban and rural middle classes toward revolutionary change, we find it prudent to go through the substage of a democratic republic. Second, due to the sensitive geopolitical setting of the country sandwiched between the two huge states of India and China, and both hostile to a revolutionary change we feel constrained to settle for a compromise solution acceptable to all.”(6)

The ability of the Nepalese revolutionaries to transcend any metaphysical idealisation of particular practice distinguishes them from other revolutionary movements and insurgency, and brings them closer to the temperament of Mao and his comrades, despite the vast difference in the national and international scenario in which they are operating. Whatever be the future results, which are not dependent on the Nepalese revolutionaries but, as noted by Bhattarai, on the amalgam of international and national factors, they have created a crisis of legitimation for the monarchy, alienated its middle class support-base gathered during its alliance with parliamentary forces, and brought the exploited and oppressed labouring classes to the centre-stage. It is clear that any future political arrangement will have to deal with the alternative participatory institutions and popular aspirations that they have helped in generating during the decade of people’s war.

Global Imperialism and Democracy in Nepal

The international interventionist forces are afraid of the evolving pattern out of the present fluidity in the Nepalese situation. India, especially, is deeply worried. It came to its senses immediately after its ambitious and phoney embargo in the aftermath of the “February coup”, after having been chastised by its own corporatist interests in Nepal. Although it says it has still not restarted supplying arms to Nepal, it admits of providing military training to the Nepalese army. In fact, it is desperately using all tactics to keep the monarchy in the scene. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran during his visit to Nepal explicitly stated on December 13 that the “constitutional forces [monarchy and political parties] should be working together... This is our view” (7).

Recently, China has been supplying arms to the Nepalese monarchy. One may suspect that there might be evolving an understanding between India and China, in this regard, to complement each other. Since the former is constrained by the domestic left forces who are against re-supplying arms to Nepal, however allowing it to train the RNA personnel, China can take over the complementary role. Both countries are not comfortable with the elimination of the institution of monarchy, and, as Shyam Saran puts, “to the extent that our objectives are the same, it is better for us to work together” (8).

Other imperialist interests - the UK and US are largely involved through India. On the other hand, the EU’s desire to become an independent pole of international relations (despite its militarist irresolution) motivated it to applaud the revolutionaries’ unilateral ceasefire and the 12-point agreement, and to call upon Gyanendra to reciprocate the ceasefire.

In this context of consensus and division among the imperialist forces globally, the democratic tasks in Nepal become furthermore complicated. This context proves decisive at least with regard to the mobilisation of the wavering democrats. The extent of the success of the democratic movement depends on the counter-balancing of this imperialist opinion and interventionism by the internal cohesion among working classes, semi-proletarians and petty bourgeoisie. This cohesion seems to have evolved to some extent, but it needs to be sustained and promoted consistently. Another factor that can help in disarming the imperialist support to monarchy is the anti-imperialist mobilisation in the interventionist countries, especially India.

References:

(1) Li Onesto, Dispatches from the People’s War in Nepal, Pluto Press, 2005

(2) Baburam Bhattarai, Monarchy Vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal, Samkaleen Teesari Duniya, New Delhi, 2005

(3) Parties, Maoists announce 12-pt agreement, Kathmandu Post, November 22 2005

(4) Present Situation and Our Historical Task, Adopted by Central Committee Meeting of CPN (Maoist) in June 2003
(5) Parvati, People’s Power in Nepal, Monthly Review, Vol 56 No 6, November 2005

(6) Maoists eye multiparty democracy, Interview with Baburam Bhattarai, Washington Times, July 30 2005

(7) Media Interaction by Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran in Kathmandu, Nepal on December 13 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India

(8) Ibid

India's Strategy of Realignment

Recent strategic relationships and nuclear agreements between India and the US, between India and Israel draw upon the imperatives of Indian capitalism and its peculiar emergence in the post-Cold War global capitalist polity. Those who perceive these relationships as decisive breakthroughs or a change in approach often forget to put them in a historical perspective. However, a word of caution is needed here for them too who see in these agreements a “sell out” to foreign interests. Proponents of this perspective do not take note of the intertwined phenomena of competition and cooperation in every international “coalitions”. They do not ponder over the fact that the hegemonic political economic interests in India are sufficiently integrated into the global class hegemony to be motivated to defend themselves globally. Recent agreements are in fact means to protect these interests in the context of the ongoing international realignment. They are not mere agentive or clientele. On the contrary, they are simultaneously collaborative and competitive, which make all ties and relationships opportunistic, fondly termed as pragmatic. India’s frequent hobnobbing with the idea of a “third world” unity in the WTO and other world forums, and its independent dealings with the Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other regimes are relevant in this regard. They are symptomatic of the complex crisscrossing of ever-dynamic international relations that constitute the global capitalist polity, of which India is an integral part. The essence of these relationships cannot be found in the ever-changing color of diplomacy, “but in an analysis of the objective position of the ruling classes in all” these countries, including India – in their conflicting and collaborative interests.


INDIA’S STRATEGY OF REALIGNMENT

Pratyush Chandra

The imperatives of the political economic structure delimit the options for political actors. At the time of India’s independence, a developed versatile capitalist class of India required a stable government, which could develop and consolidate the national market for it, along with dealing effectively with the bipolar global set-up that evolved after the Second World War. India’s non-alignment was a result of this scenario. It always tried to balance its relationship with the two blocs, and cautiously played them to bargain as much as it could. Regarding the Middle East, considering the dependence of the developing industries of India on the energy resources of Arabia, India definitely preferred to negotiate with the non-‘cartelized’ nationalist regimes in the region, which went well with its domestic industrialization strategy and its relative “non-alignment” internationally. Israel’s existence based on colonization, and its position in the Middle East policy of the West, was necessarily a disturbing factor undermining the nationalist regimes in the Middle East, perpetuating a kind of political economic ‘cartelization’ in the region, under the US or against it. This informed India’s relatively consistent anti-Israel attitude during the Cold War, even if there were occasions when it went into secret intelligence dealings with Israel to combat the ‘danger’ from its immediate neighbors – Pakistan and China.(1)

The pragmatism of the Indian approach could be witnessed further in the 1980s when the US clearly edged over the Soviet Union in its struggle for hegemony in the Middle East with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey aligning with it, while Saddam’s Iraq acted as a pawn to subvert the danger from Iran. India could feel the fizzling out of the bipolarity, and started seeking to establish new strategies to address its requirements. Rajiv Gandhi’s changed stance was the result of this situation, with the growing internal/external demand for liberalization. India’s approach towards everything seemed to change – Middle East, Israel, USA. It was the phase of the crisis of non-alignment, or in other words, the situation for realignment. The balance of payments crisis, a new surge in the local demand to open up the economy for global capital integration and reclaiming of the state-regulated sectors all pooled up to shape the future course of the Indian foreign policy. The decision to refuel the American warplanes during Chandrashekhar’s regime in 1991 was the first formal and fatal blow to the principle of non-alignment. However, it was left for Narasimha Rao’s government in 1992 to do the initial systematization of the Indian foreign policy for the new era.

In 1992, Narasimha Rao destroyed one of the major pillars of the so-called “nonalignment” that guided India’s international relations during the Cold War, when he established full ties with Israel. The Vajpayee government stretched this to the extent of a complete abandonment of the principle of nonalignment. Manmohan Singh has now completed the process, by abandoning the formal Indian stand for strengthening the UNO as the global coalition to resolve international disputes and provide humanitarian aids. Becoming a part of the US-led 4-nation coalition (which included its other most stable allies in the region, Japan and Australia) for tsunami relief efforts, the “pragmatic” India showed the world, other western powers and its former comrades in the NAM (non-aligned movement) that it sides with the US. It aligned with the US’ unilateral strategy of imposing its own designs on the world community, by carrying out its moves and then using the UN as a rubber stamp. The recent IAEA vote reconfirmed India’s own design.

The Indo-US relationship has continuously intensified since Clinton’s visit to India in the year 2000. It was not simply, as Americans pose, a result of the one-way Indian “need to diversify its international relationships” after “the demise of the Soviet Union — India’s main trading partner and most reliable source of economic assistance and military equipment for most of the Cold War”.(2) In fact, the US sanctions after the nuclear tests by India were rendered emasculated by its own businessmen who realized that sanctions would give free field to the European capital in the vast South Asian market. Clinton’s visit immediately afterwards to salvage the relationship indicates at the American desperation. The US knows quite well that due to India’s consistent political economic structure and not being exclusively dependent on international aid and investment, it is the most reliable and stable regime in the region. The overall dominance of the Indian capital in South Asia makes India a regional power, and no other country can rival its hegemony, except China, which makes India’s recognition all the more important. Bush patronizes the Indian leadership, ever ready to wait on him, while indicating his own interest in the growth of the Indo-US relationship – “We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. …We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia. Differences remain, including over the development of India’s nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India’s economic reforms. But while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future.”(3) And now these differences are definitely giving way to active cooperation.

After the 9/11 incidents, this relationship between India and the US has acquired a new impetus and dimension. The most significant and worrisome aspect is the militarist content of this relationship. “In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, India took the immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the United States full cooperation and the use of India’s bases for counterterrorism operations.” In November 2001 the meeting between Bush and Vajpayee took place. Since then “notable progress has come in the area of security cooperation, with an increasingly strong focus on counterterrorism, joint military exercises, and arms sales. In December 2001, the India-U.S. Defense Policy Group met in New Delhi for the first time since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and outlined a defense partnership based on regular and high-level policy dialogue.” In September 2004, “the sixth meeting of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was held in Delhi… In October, Under Secretary of Commerce Juster and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rocca made separate visits to New Delhi to discuss Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) issues with Indian leaders, who said that “substantial progress” had been made in NSSP implementation. Also in October, “Malabar 2004,” the sixth round of U.S.-India joint naval exercises, took place off India’s west coast.”(4)

Furthermore, the “Joint Statement by India-US Defence Policy Group” (Aug 6-7, 2003) exposed the real position of the erstwhile Vajpayee government on the post-9/11 international developments, on Iraq and Afghanistan, despite its rhetoric and resolutions against these wars in the Indian parliament. After enumerating the achievements of the Indo-US defence relations in the year 2002-03 (that included “combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise in Northeast India”), “the two sides welcomed the improved prospects for freedom and security in the Middle East. They underlined their commitment to … the contribution that international cooperation could make to that process. They agreed to continue to seek ways for the United States and India to work together to support the people of Iraq. They also welcomed the establishment of Iraq's Governing Council… They discussed the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and reaffirmed the ongoing commitment of both countries to the future of Afghanistan.”(5)

However it is the Indo-Israel relationship that graduates India as a reliable candidate in the Anglo-American nexus. A necessary precondition for any stable relation with the USA is to cooperate with Israel. Egypt, Jordan, and others, learnt this in their own manner. These countries chose to become US allies in the declining phase of Soviet Union’s prowess, as the US held, to quote the Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat, “90 percent of the cards”. The Soviet Union stood as a support during the national reconstruction of the newly independent countries of Asia, but its own political economic vulnerability in the era of “peaceful coexistence” or the Cold War, could never make it a long-term provider for the monopoly and rent-oriented interests of the oil economies. Further, Israel’s innate expansionism provided the US regime an effective tool in the Middle East “to start the collapse of the populist nationalist regimes, to break their alliance with the Soviet Union” and pursue the US.(6) The defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war with Israel and eventual change in its stance became a lesson for other countries in the region. Compromising with Israel is the only road to get morsels from the US hegemony in the Middle East.

India too decided to tow the line. Right from the time of Rajiv Gandhi, subsequent governments of all hues and colours have consistently contributed in promoting Indo-Israel relationship. Last year, Israeli Vice Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during his visit to India confidently rejected any suggestion that Israel will have difficulties in dealing with India's “left-leaning” Congress Party-led coalition government. He said, “It was the Congress government which established friendly relations with us 11 years ago and I find no difference in policy of the previous government and the present regime."(7) Definitely, Olmert’s optimism was well founded – change in faces in the government really does not matter. Be it in India, Israel or elsewhere. This is what is today termed as pragmatism and even ‘de-politicisation’ of national interests. Condoling Arafat’s death, the mainstream left parties in India reiterated their long-term stand in favour of the Palestinian state. They asked the Congress government supported by them to sever military ties with the Israelis, reverting the previous government’s deep rightist fascination for this relationship.(8) But Manmohan Singh seems to be in no dire need to comply with every demand of his allies, since he knows that they are in as much need (if not more) to support him, as he has the need for their support.

Even the Indo-Israel relationship is heavily militaristic. In December 2004, India and Israel concluded their third Joint Working Group meet on defence cooperation. Israel became the second largest defence equipment supplier to India. It is time and again asserted, especially by the Indian corporate interests, that defence is the core sector in which Indo-Israeli relationship has immense potentiality. “The driver of pro-Israel relations is the defence establishment, which finds no alternative to Israeli high-tech weapons, and defence cooperation between the two countries has become so far-reaching that it is impossible to reverse it, without knocking the bottom out of India’s security.”(9)

Recent strategic relationships and nuclear agreements between India and the US, between India and Israel draw upon the imperatives of Indian capitalism and its peculiar emergence in the post-Cold War global capitalist polity. Those who perceive these relationships as decisive breakthroughs or a change in approach often forget to put them in a historical perspective. However, a word of caution is needed here for them too who see in these agreements a “sell out” to foreign interests. Proponents of this perspective do not take note of the intertwined phenomena of competition and cooperation in every international “coalitions”. They do not ponder over the fact that the hegemonic political economic interests in India are sufficiently integrated into the global class hegemony to be motivated to defend themselves globally. Recent agreements are in fact means to protect these interests in the context of the ongoing international realignment. They are not mere agentive or clientele. On the contrary, they are simultaneously collaborative and competitive, which make all ties and relationships opportunistic, fondly termed as pragmatic. India’s frequent hobnobbing with the idea of a “third world” unity in the WTO and other world forums, and its independent dealings with the Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other regimes are relevant in this regard. They are symptomatic of the complex crisscrossing of ever-dynamic international relations that constitute the global capitalist polity, of which India is an integral part. The essence of these relationships cannot be found in the ever-changing color of diplomacy, “but in an analysis of the objective position of the ruling classes in all” these countries (10), including India – in their conflicting and collaborative interests.


Notes

(1) P.R. Kumaraswamy (1998), “Strategic Partnership between Israel and India”, Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 2 No. 2

(2) K. Alan Kronstadt (2004), Indo-US Relations, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress, Washington DC

(3) The White House (2002), “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”

(4) Kronstadt, op cit

(5) Joint Statement by INDIA–US Defence Policy Group Meet (Aug 6-7 2003) at Washington DC

(6) Samir Amin (2004), “The US Imperialism and the Middle East”, in P. Chandra, A. Ghosh & R. Kumar, The Politics of Imperialism and Counterstrategies, Aakar Books, New Delhi

(7) India, Israel float think-tank, Dawn 9th December 2004

(8) Sever military ties with Israel: Left, The Hindu 24th Nov 2004

(9) New hand: Worsening Israeli relations with Pakistan is a boon for India, September 13 2004

(10) V.I. Lenin (1916), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Indian Edition (Left Word, New Delhi, 2000, p.37)